

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03457 01 OF 03 051246Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O R 051005Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1791
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ANKARA 3457

EXDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR TEXT)
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, TU
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH GOT OF EMBARGO, CYPRUS, AND CONGRESSIONAL
PROBLEMS

REF: STATE 113201

1. AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, SAW MFA SEC GEN ELEKDAG
AFTERNOON MAY 4 TO CARRY OUT DEMARCHE INSTRUCTED REFTEL
(PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AND FONMIN ARE BOTH OUT OF COUNTRY).
ELEKDAG WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TULUMEN AND OZGUL. AMBASSADOR
SAID HE WAS INSTRUCTED REINFORCE NIMETZ-VEST MEETING
OF MAY 3 WITH ESENBEL AND STRESS ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERN
ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION, PREFERABLY WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD DECIDED TO MAKE HIS PRESENTATION
TO ELEKDAG AND AT THE SAME TIME TO REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT
WITH PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT SOME TIME AFTER HIS RETURN
FROM BULGARIA.

2. AMBASSADOR BEGAN BY SUMMARIZING MAY 3 VOTE IN HIRC.
HE EMPHASIZED ADMINISTRATION HAD NARROWLY WON 18/17. IF ALL
MEMBERS HAD BEEN PRESENT, ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE SUFFERED

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A DEFEAT. THIS RESULT HAD OCCURRED IN ONE PLACE WHERE
ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION WAS STRONG AND NARROWNESS OF VOTE
CAST GREAT DOUBT ON WHETHER ADMINISTRATION COULD WIN FLOOR
VOTE. FURTHERMORE, PRESIDENT HAD BEEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED,
AS HAD SECRETARIES VANCE AND BROWN. THE US ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSAL WAS IN TROUBLE. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD COMMITTED
ITSELF AND ITS PRESTIGE TO VICTORY. THE US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP

WAS ALSO IN DANGER.

3. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT GOT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IT DID NOT INTEND TO IMPROVE ITS CYPRUS PROPOSALS AS A STEP TOWARD HELPING WITH THE CONGRESS. GOT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IT BELIEVED THAT IT WAS UP TO USG TO GET EMBARGO REPEALED. IT WAS APPARENT TO AMBASSADOR THAT GOT BELIEVED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT FULLY COMMITTED TO LIFTING THE EMBARGO, THAT IT COULD GET THE EMBARGO LIFTED IF IT EXERTED MAXIMUM EFFORT, AND THAT USG APPEALS FOR HELP WERE A WAY OF USING CONGRESS TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM TURKEY ON CYPRUS. THAT BELIEF WAS WRONG. IF GOT CONTINUED TO HOLD THIS VIEW, RESULTS WOULD PROBABLY BE TRAGIC.

4. AMBASSADOR SAID HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THE CHANCES WERE NOW LESS THAN 50/50 THAT ADMINISTRATION COULD WIN IN CONGRESS. HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT STRONGEST POSSIBLE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT FACES CONGRESSIONAL BATTLES ON SALT AND AIRCRAFT SALES IN MIDDLE EAST AS WELL. ALL OF THESE WERE DIFFICULT AND THE OUTLOOK WAS NOT GOOD. IF THE TURKS, INDEED, DID BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS SOMEHOW PLAYING GAMES WITH THEM, HE WAS COMPELLED TO SAY THAT AT A TIME WHEN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS WERE SO DEEPLY ENGAGED, SUCH SUSPICIONS WERE SIMPLY OUT OF PLACE. THEREFORE HE WAS ASKING GOT TO RECONSIDER WHETHER IT COULD HELP--REALIZING THAT
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WITHOUT HELP EFFORTS NOW BEING MADE WOULD PROBABLY FAIL. AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY EXPECTED DEFEAT IN THE UPCOMING SENATE VOTE, BUT EXPLAINED PROCEDURE BY WHICH AMENDMENT COULD BE INTRODUCED ON FLOOR OF SENATE WHERE HE UNDERSTOOD SITUATION LOOKED SLIGHTLY BETTER.

5. AMBASSADOR SAID NIMETZ AND VEST HAD MADE CLEAR USG NOT ASKING TURKS TO IMPROVE OR ALTER THE TURK CYPRIOT PROPOSALS PRIOR TO OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED THAT IN FACT USG DID NOT HAVE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS IN THE PROPOSALS. WHAT USG WAS ASKING WAS TURK RECOGNITION THAT BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION WAS BEING LOST AND THAT SYMPATHY OF CONGRESSMEN WHO HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH GREEK LOBBY HAD NOT BEEN WON. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT POTENTIAL FLEXIBILITY AND OTHER ASPECTS COMMENDING PROPOSALS TO OUTSIDERS HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY PRESENTED AND PUBLICIZED. USG WAS ASKING GOT TO PROJECT THAT FLEXIBILITY AND TO EMPHASIZE PROMISE THAT PROPOSALS HELD FOR A GENEROUS SETTLEMENT. DOUBTS OF CONGRESSMEN ABOUT WHAT TURKEY HAD DONE AND WAS WILLING TO DO IN CYPRUS MUST BE RESOLVED. WHAT GOT DID AND SAID WOULD BE FAR MORE CONVINCING THAN WHAT USG COULD SAY.

6. AMBASSADOR CONTINUED THAT IT WAS NOT FOR USG TO TELL TURKEY HOW TO NEGOTIATE OR WHAT DETAILED STEPS TO TAKE. GOT COULD BEST FIGURE OUT HOW TO IMPROVE PRESENTATION OF PROPOSALS STRESSING FLEXIBILITY. OBVIOUSLY ANYTHING FURTHER THAT COULD BE GIVEN TO WALDHEIM AS ADDITIONAL AND PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS BASIS FOR RESUMING TALKS WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

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7. AMBASSADOR ALSO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF PRIME MINISTER COULD HOLD TALKS WITH KEY CONGRESSMEN DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON FOR NATO SUMMIT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI WAS ARRANGING MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND HIRC MEMBERS AND HOUSE LEADERS MORNING JUNE 1. USG WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT PRIME MIN, INSTEAD OF RETURNING JUNE 3 TO TURKEY FROM NEW YORK, GO BACK TO WASHINGTON ON MONDAY, JUNE 5 OR TUESDAY, JUNE 6 TO MEET WITH KEY SENATORS INCLUDING MEMBERS OF SFRC. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED IMPORTANCE THAT BEGIN AND SADAT ATTACHED TO FREQUENT MEETINGS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. SADAT HAD HAD TREMENDOUS SUCCESS IN IMPROVING EGYPTIAN POSITION IN U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION, AND TURKISH NEED WAS NOT DISSIMILAR. AMBASSADOR ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD NOTED IN PRESS THAT PRIME MINISTER WAS GOING TO BRUSSELS WHERE HE WOULD BE TALKING TO PRESS AND THEN TO LONDON WHERE HE WOULD SPEAK TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES. ALL THESE WOULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECEVIT TO STRESS TURKISH POSITION AND IN PARTICULAR IISS WAS ONE THAT COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY.

8. AMBASSADOR SUMMED UP BY EMPHASIZING THAT ADMINISTRATION
HAD RUN INTO MORE RESISTANCE IN CONGRESS THAN IT HAD

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EXPECTED. GOT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT A PROPAGANDA BATTLE WAS
GOING ON. AT THE MOMENT THE OPPOSITION WAS WINNING IT.
KYPRIANOU HAD SUCCEEDED IN PORTRAYING GOT APPROACH AS RIGID,
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AS UNWORKABLE, ITS TERRITORIAL
PROPOSALS AS INVOLVING A RETURN OF A DERISORY 1 PERCENT.
PUBLIC OPINION SEEMED TO BE SUSTAINING KYPRIANOU'S JUDGMENT.
WE KNEW THE TURKS HAD FLEXIBILITY IN ALL THESE AREAS, BUT THIS
MESSAGE WAS NOT GETTING ACROSS EFFECTIVELY. CONSTANT EFFECTIVE
REPETITION WAS REQUIRED STRESSING TURKISH DESIRE FOR A CYPRUS
SETTLEMENT, READINESS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT DELAY
OR PRECONDITION, FLEXIBILITY OF ITS POSITION ON ALL OF THE
ISSUES. THIS REQUIRED HIGHEST LEVEL AND MOST IMAGINATIVE
ATTENTION OF GOT. ADMINISTRATION WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED.
POTENTIAL LONG-RUN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF
FAILURE TO REPEAL EMBARGO FOR NATO, FOR TURKEY, FOR CYPRUS,
FOR GREECE, FOR ENTIRE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, FOR EAST-WEST
BALANCE AND FOR US-TURKISH RELATIONS SHOULD NOT BE UNDER-
ESTIMATED. PROBLEM OF CYPRUS PALED IN IMPORTANCE IN COMPARISON.

9. ELEKDAG REPLIED THAT HE WISHED TO REVIEW PART OF
HISTORY OF THIS EFFORT. LAST FALL, DURING DEMIREL GOVERNMENT,
USG AND GOT HAD ARRIVED AT UNDERSTANDING ON JOINT STEPS.
INCLUDED IN THAT UNDERSTANDING WAS AGREEMENT THAT INVOLVEMENT
OF GREECE WAS NECESSARY. IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD THAT WITHOUT
GREECE THERE COULD BE NO SOLUTION. THAT WAS WHY TURKEY HAD
WANTED QUADRIPARTITE TALKS. WHEN PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT TOOK
POWER, HE SAW THAT LONG DELAY WAS INVOLVED IN PUTTING
PRESSURE ON GREECE THROUGH U.S. THEREFORE, PRIME MINISTER
HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE. HE HAD MADE PUBLIC STATEMENT. HE HAD
TOLD WALDHEIM THAT IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TURKISH
PRIME MINISTER TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO CYPRUS. ECEVIT HAD
QUIT GOVERNMENT IN 1974 BECAUSE COMPOSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT
IN 1974 BECAUSE COMPOSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT PREVENTED HIS

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SEEKING A SOLUTION.

10. ECEVIT'S APPROACH WAS "STRATEGIC", NOT TACTICAL. HE
HAD PERSUADED DENKTASH TO GO ALONG WITH HIM. HE BELIEVED
THAT USG HAD SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON PROPOSALS. ECEVIT
HAD GIVEN QUITE A BIT TO MR. CHRISTOPHER. ALSO, TURKS
HAD HELPED IN LANGUAGE FOR USG REPLIES TO CONGRESS.

AMBASSADOR HAD TALKED WITH FONMIN OKCUN ABOUT HELP FOR CHRISTOPHER IN HIS SFRC STATEMENT, AND HE SAID GOT HAD NOT OBJECTED TO CHRISTOPHER STATEMENT. TURKISH POSITION WAS CLEAR. IT HAD NAMED SIX OR SEVEN SPECIFIC PLACES FOR DISCUSSION OF ADJUSTMENT OF TERRITORY. IT HAD MADE PROPOSITION ON VAROSHA WHICH ALLOWED RETURN OF GREEK CYPRIOTS AND MADE CLEAR FUTURE STATUS OF VAROSHA OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. WALDHEIM HAD CALLED TURK PROPOSALS CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL. IT WOULD BE ABSURD FOR TURKS TO HAVE MORE CONCRETE PROPOSALS. THIS WOULD FREEZE THEM IN PUBLIC OPINION BOTH IN THE WORLD AND AT HOME. TURK POSITION WAS NOT "TACTICAL". ITS APPROACH WAS SENSIBLE AND SERIOUS. BUT WALDHEIM, BECAUSE OF GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION, WAS HESITANT. HE WAS INHIBITED BY ABSENCE OF STRONG PRESSURE FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

11. ELEKDAG SAID "MORAL SUPPORT" FOR WALDHEIM FROM US AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES WAS NEEDED. TURKEY WAS AT A CROSSROADS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THIS WAS A CASE WHERE ONE SIDE WHICH HAS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH SEES THAT GOOD FAITH UNREQUITED. RESULT IS THAT IT LOSES ITS FAITH. SINCE HIS RETURN FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, ELEKDAG HAD SEEN GREECE DO EVERYTHING TO CREATE TENSION, E.G., GREEK RESPONSE TO ECEVIT'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE. GREEK PRESS CONTINUED TO PUBLISH ANTI-TURKISH PROPAGANDA, E.G., COUNCIL OF EUROPE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON TURKEY WHICH REFLECTED ALLEGATIONS OF ONE SIDE. WHEN OKCUN TALKED TO PAPALIGOURAS AT STRASBOURG, PAPALIGOURAS SAID ONLY THAT MEETING OF GREEK AND TURKISH SECRETARY GENERALS WOULD BE "CATASTROPHIC."

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12. ELEKDAG CONTINUED, THE GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOT OBJECTIVE WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR. IT WAS TO MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO. THEREFORE, U.S. HAD RESPONSIBILITY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE GREEKS AS WELL AS ON WALDHEIM, AND THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF US DOING SO. THE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS OF FAILURE THAT AMBASSADOR HAD CITED WOULD ALSO BE DETRIMENTAL TO GREEK INTERESTS. HE SUMMED UP, "TURKEY HAS DONE ALL IT CAN DO. IT HAS STRESSED ITS FLEXIBILITY. IT CANNOT DO MORE. THAT IS THE POLICY OF THIS GOVERNMENT."

13. TULUMEN REPORTED THAT WALDHEIM HAD SOLEMNLY TOLD THE TURKS THAT HE WOULD "CONDEMN" THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IF THEY REFUSED TO COME TO A MEETING. NOW HE HAD CHANGED HIS POSITION. ELEKDAG INTERJECTED THAT UNSYG HAD CONVENED SIX ROUNDS OF MEETINGS. NEVER BEFORE HAD THERE BEEN PRECONDITIONS. AMBASSADOR ASKED WHY TURKS THOUGHT WALDHEIM WAS SO HESITANT. ELEKDAG REPLIED, "BECAUSE GREEK CYPRIOTS RAISED HELL." GOT HAD ASKED EC-9 FOR HELP BUT NOW THE EC-9 SAYS IT WILL NOT DO ANYTHING WITHOUT SEEING GOT PROPOSALS. NEITHER THEY NOR U.S. HAD PUT REAL PRESSURE ON WALDHEIM TO MOVE AHEAD.

14. ELEKDAG THEN TURNED TO THE BINGHAM AMENDMENT. HE
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CHARACTERIZED IT AS "A HALF-EMBARGO" THAT WOULD UNDO IN PART THE RECOMMENDATION TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. IT ALSO INCLUDED A "DONATION" OF \$35 MILLION FOR GREECE. THIS WAS AFTER CHRISTOPHER HAD TOLD OKCUN AND ECEVIT THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN FAVOR OF GOT THIS YEAR.

15. AMBASSADOR ASKED "WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?" ELEKDAG SAID HE WOULD CONVEY AMBASSADOR'S MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO PRIME MINISTER. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND USG PRESS ON EVERYBODY THE NEED TO TRY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING. HE FELT IT WAS GOING TO BE HARD TO GET WALDHEIM TO DO MUCH UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. ELEKDAG SAID THAT WALDHEIM IS SENDING POHL TO TALK TO THE PARTIES WOULD PRODUCE NOTHING.

16. ELEKDAG, IN PARTICULARLY EARNEST AND HEARTFELT SUMMATION, SAID BOTH TURKEY AND US WERE BEING "MANIPULATED." TURKEY WOULD MAKE MORE STATEMENTS AND TRY TO DO BETTER ON PUBLIC OPINION FRONT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY DISHEARTENED BY THE BINGHAM AMENDMENT, THE \$35 MILLION GRANT. IT WAS NOT THE MONEY, BUT THE GESTURE, THAT WAS "TERRIBLE". THE MORE THE GREEKS WERE "OBNOXIOUS", THE MORE THEY WERE BEING REWARDED BY THE US CONGRESS. "THE WHOLE THING IS BECOMING HUMILIATING. I HAVE HAD GREAT FAITH IN US-TURKISH FRIENDSHIP. BUT TO ME IT ALSO IS HUMILIATING. GREAT SHADOWS HAVE BEEN CAST. ALL OF OUR AFFAIRS ARE DISCUSSED IN THE U.S. CONGRESS. THE GREEKS WILL NEVER BE SATISFIED. NOW IT IS CYPRUS. WHAT NEXT?"

17. COMMENT: WE HAVE NEVER SEEN ELEKDAG IN A MORE SOMBER MOOD. THE POSITIVE ELEMENT IN ALL OF THIS IS THAT HE DID SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THEREFORE MORE CLARIFICATION OF THE FLEXIBILITY IN THE TURKISH POSITION. GIVEN THE PRESENT TURKISH MOOD, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT STATEMENTS WILL RUN MORE TOWARD DENUNCIATION OF THE GREEKS

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THAN TOWARD THE KINDS OF STATEMENTS THAT WILL BE MORE HELPFUL IN THE CONGRESS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE OUR NEEDS AT ALL LEVELS. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL, HOWEVER, THAT THE MOOD OF BITTERNESS AND DISILLUSIONMENT IS GROWING HERE. THEY DEEPLY BELIEVE WE HAVE NOT DONE WHAT WE SAID WE WOULD. I TAKE ELEKDAG'S COMMENT ON THE BINGHAM AMENDMENT AT FACE VALUE. IT IS NOT DOG-IN-THE-MANGER BECAUSE THE GREEKS ARE GETTING MAP GRANT. IT IS A CLEAR SIGN TO THE TURKS THAT IN THE GREEK-TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP THEY ARE INEVITABLY BOTTOM MAN, A "WHAT'S THE USE" ATTITUDE.

18. ECEVIT IS DUE BACK TOMORROW. I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SEE HIM SOON, BUT I AM SURE THE MESSAGE WILL BE GOTTEN TO HIM. ECEVIT'S APPLICATION OF HIS PERSONAL CHARM, PERSUASIVENESS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS TALENTS TO IMPROVE TURKEY'S IMAGE WITH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CONGRESS MAY REPRESENT BEST CHANGE. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT HIS REACTION WILL BE THAT IT IS BENEATH THE DIGNITY OF THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER TO PLACE HIMSELF ON TRIAL BEFORE AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN. THIS IS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN ELEKDAG'S COMMENT ABOUT HUMILIATION. UNFORTUNATELY THERE IS GROWING FEELING HERE THAT IF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS ARE DEPENDENT ON TURKISH TOADYING TO CONGRESS AND TRYING TO COMPETE WITH GREEK LOBBY (WORD 'LOBBY' HERE HAS CONNOTATION OF SLIGHTLY DISHONORABLE ACTIVITIES), IT IS NOT WORTH THE GAME AND TURKEY MUST LOOK ELSEWHERE.

19. BEFORE I SEE ECEVIT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT RE THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO EMBARGO ISSUE. THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING HERE THAT WHILE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ARE MADE ON PANAMA CANAL, SALT, MIDDLE EAST AIRCRAFT SALES, FACT THAT NOTHING HAS BEEN PUBLICLY SAID FROM WHITE HOUSE ON THIS ISSUE IMPLIES LESS THAN A SINCERE COMMITMENT. SUCH A STATEMENT WILL MAKE MY EFFORTS WITH ECEVIT MORE PERSUASIVE AND EFFECTIVE. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE IN HAND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT HE WILL HAVE A BILATERAL SESSION WITH THE PRESIDENT

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WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON FOR NATO SUMMIT.
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Message Attributes

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